What goes wrong in distressed investing, and how investors can monitor it
Distressed positions fail for identifiable reasons: enforcement stalls, collateral proves worth less than assumed, courts intervene, risks arrive together, or capital is needed before the recoveries come in. This article works through each with an illustrative scenario, then sets out what good reporting contains and how an investor can test a manager.
Contents
The nature of the risk
Every risk described in this article has materialised in Indian transactions. The useful question for an investor is how far each can be identified before purchase, priced into the entry and managed afterwards, and how far managing it depends on the competence of whoever is doing the work.
Most risks in distressed credit are specific to a position and operational in character. Execution delay, overvalued collateral, friction between jurisdictions and litigation by borrowers can each be assessed account by account, reflected in the acquisition price and managed through legal capability and diversification. They differ in kind from the hidden, system-wide leverage of a financial crisis, which cannot be assessed one position at a time. They become damaging when a manager underestimates them at entry or lacks the infrastructure to deal with them, and the scenarios that follow show how that happens.
The risks fall into two groups. Some can be detected before purchase, such as a title defect, occupied premises or a borrower with a record of obstructive litigation, and belong either in the price or in a decision not to buy. Others arise afterwards, such as a court stay, a fall in the property market or contamination below ground, and can only be absorbed by the margin left at entry and by the spread of positions across the portfolio.
| Risk | Severity | Probability | Primary mitigation |
|---|---|---|---|
| Execution delay | Moderate | High | More than one enforcement route; an experienced legal team |
| Collateral overvaluation | High | Moderate | Independent valuation from more than one source; cover of 1.5 to 2.0 times the entry price |
| Jurisdictional variation | Moderate | Moderate | Collateral spread across several states |
| Borrower litigation | Low to moderate | High | Legal diligence before acquisition; reserves for cost and delay |
| Compounding risk | Very high | Low where diversified | Pricing discipline; diversification across positions |
| Illiquidity | Moderate | Certain | Committing only capital with no need for early exit |
Execution risk
The return in distressed credit is earned through a chain of active steps: a legal notice, physical possession and an auction, or else a negotiation, settlement documents and a transfer of funds. Each step can fail or slip. A demand notice under the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (SARFAESI) can be challenged by writ petition. A District Magistrate may be slow to schedule the possession hearing. Possession may be obstructed by the borrower’s family or by encroachers. An auction may draw no bids at the reserve price, and a settlement may collapse at the last moment when the borrower’s financing falls through.
A scenario makes this concrete. A buyer has obtained a possession order from the District Magistrate for a commercial property, and its enforcement team arrives at 10 am. The premises are occupied by the borrower’s family business, with forty employees at work. The borrower’s counsel arrives with a stay order from the Debts Recovery Tribunal, obtained the previous evening, arguing that the demand notice was procedurally defective. The team has to decide on the spot whether the order is valid and applies, whether to proceed or withdraw, and how to handle the employees and the local authorities. That decision falls to an experienced enforcement professional on site who has managed contested possessions before and knows how the local tribunal tends to act.
Across a portfolio the burden adds up. Enforcement proceedings spread over several states each have their own borrower, counsel, District Magistrate’s office and facts, and they run alongside settlement negotiations, project completion and quarterly reporting. Handling them takes experienced lawyers, trained enforcement staff, networks of local counsel, case management systems and senior oversight. A manager without that depth will find that the recovery in its model bears little relation to the cash the portfolio produces. Execution risk is reduced by operating capability; financial structuring does little for it.
Collateral valuation risk
A collateral floor is only as reliable as the valuation beneath it, and Indian real estate valuations are imprecise. As at April 2026, two independent valuers assessing the same property could produce estimates 25 to 35 per cent apart. Market conditions at the time of a forced sale may differ materially from those at acquisition, and environmental contamination, a title defect found after purchase or a change in zoning can impair what land or buildings will realise.
In an illustrative composite, a buyer acquires a loan for ₹20 crore, secured on a commercial property valued at ₹32 crore by two independent valuers. Two years later, when enforcement is complete, the micro-market has weakened. A fresh valuation puts the property at ₹24 crore, and the auction, held in a weak market, draws a top bid of ₹19 crore. After enforcement costs the net recovery is ₹17 crore against an entry price of ₹20 crore, a loss of ₹3 crore, or 15 per cent.
The mitigation is conservative valuation from more than one source at acquisition, with collateral cover of at least 1.5 to 2.0 times the acquisition cost. A buyer that acquires only where independently assessed collateral covers the entry price at least 1.5 times can absorb a fall of 30 to 35 per cent in collateral value before the position loses money.
Some defects lie beyond the reach of ordinary diligence. In the composite portfolio of thirty-seven loans followed in “A stressed loan portfolio from purchase to recovery: an illustrative walk-through”, one account was a ₹12 crore loan secured on an industrial plot valued at ₹8 crore and bought for about ₹3.4 crore, 28 per cent of outstanding. During enforcement the buyer found subsurface contamination that physical inspection could not have revealed. The municipal authority required remediation before the plot could be transferred, at an estimated cost of ₹2.5 crore. Since remediation would cost more than the net proceeds of an eventual sale, the buyer wrote the position off: recovery was nil and the loss was the full entry price. Title failures, which diligence can usually detect, are described in the same walk-through.
Legal, jurisdictional and counterparty risk
Litigation by the borrower is the most frequent source of delay. Another account in the same composite portfolio was an ₹18 crore loan secured on a commercial property in a Tier 2 city, valued at ₹12 crore by two independent valuers and bought for about ₹5.5 crore, 30 per cent of outstanding. The plan was enforcement under SARFAESI, recovering ₹9 crore within twelve months. The borrower filed a writ petition in the High Court alleging procedural defects in the original loan documents, and the court granted an interim stay. The stay lasted eleven months before it was vacated, and no possession or auction could proceed in the meantime.
By the time enforcement resumed the property market had softened, and the auction drew a single bidder at ₹7 crore. After enforcement costs of about ₹80 lakh, the net recovery was ₹6.2 crore against an entry price of about ₹5.5 crore, received after twenty-three months. The position still recovered more than it cost because the entry price was low enough to absorb a long stay and a weaker market together.
Jurisdiction adds a further layer. Some benches of the National Company Law Tribunal process cases efficiently, while others carry backlogs that push insolvency resolution well past the 330-day statutory limit, and the efficiency of SARFAESI enforcement differs between states. Regulation also continues to change: amendments to priority rules under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, capital requirements for asset reconstruction companies or the interpretation of SARFAESI procedure can alter the economics of positions already held. For how enforcement varies by state, and how that variation should enter pricing, see “Enforcing a secured loan under SARFAESI: from demand notice to auction”.
The counterparty is the last element. A defaulted promoter may litigate obstructively, dissipate assets or contest every stage. Forensic review of prior conduct is the best available predictor, and a documented history of misconduct belongs in the price and should lower any expectation of cooperation.
When risks compound
Individual risks can usually be absorbed. The danger comes when several materialise on the same position at once. In an illustrative composite, a buyer acquires a loan with ₹50 crore outstanding for ₹18 crore, 36 per cent of outstanding, secured on a mixed-use property in a Tier 2 city valued at ₹38 crore. The plan assumes enforcement under SARFAESI recovering ₹30 crore within twelve months.
The borrower files a writ petition and the High Court grants a nine-month stay. During the stay the local property market falls by 15 per cent, and a fresh valuation puts the property at ₹28 crore. The buyer takes possession once the stay is vacated and holds an auction, which draws one bidder at ₹22 crore. After enforcement costs the net recovery is ₹20 crore against an entry price of ₹18 crore, received after twenty-one months instead of twelve and ₹10 crore short of the planned recovery.
The position still recovered its cost because the entry price absorbed a stay, a market decline and a thin auction at the same time. Had the buyer paid 50 per cent of outstanding, or ₹25 crore, the same ₹20 crore recovery would have produced a loss of ₹5 crore.
₹7 crore
Compounding risk is severe when it occurs and unlikely in any one position of a diversified portfolio. The defences are pricing discipline at entry and enough positions, across enough collateral types and states, that no single compounding failure decides the portfolio’s result. For the full arithmetic of entry price, see “What protects capital in a distressed investment: collateral, entry price and time”.
Liquidity, and how a downturn cuts both ways
Distressed credit is illiquid. Capital committed to a distressed vehicle is generally locked up for several years, with no secondary market for interests and no redemption mechanism, and cash arrives as individual positions resolve, on a timetable the investor does not control. An investor who may need the capital during that period should not commit it. An allocation that has to be unwound early will do worse than lag, because without an orderly exit a forced sale destroys value. The discount available at entry is partly compensation for accepting the lock-up, and only investors able to hold for the full period receive it.
An economic downturn works on a distressed portfolio through two channels that pull in opposite directions. The first is negative: lower collateral values reduce recoveries on positions that depend on enforcement. A commercial property valued at ₹40 crore at acquisition may realise only ₹30 crore at auction if the property market falls during enforcement, and borrowers have less capacity to settle while fewer bidders attend auctions. The second channel is positive. A downturn creates new distress, more sellers come to market, risk-averse capital withdraws and acquisition discounts widen.
Which channel dominates depends on where a portfolio is in its life. For a portfolio already invested and in its recovery phase, a downturn is a headwind that usually moderates recoveries without reversing them, because the entry price already reflects deep discounts to pre-stress collateral values. A loan bought at 35 per cent of outstanding when its collateral was valued at 60 per cent of outstanding can absorb a substantial fall in collateral value before it moves into loss. For capital still being deployed, a downturn widens both the pool and the discounts on offer. An investor reading a manager’s exposure to a downturn should therefore separate positions already held from capital yet to be invested.
What good position-level reporting contains
A distressed position has no observable market price. Its value depends on an expected recovery and an expected timeline, both uncertain, on an asset that may be contested, and two competent managers can value the same position differently. Investors depend on the manager’s reporting to see what is happening to their capital, so what they are really assessing is the process that produces the numbers.
Good reporting is quarterly and position by position. For each account it covers:
- The current recovery strategy and any change of track since the last report.
- The status of legal proceedings and material developments, such as settlement offers received, possession completed or auctions held.
- Acquisition cost, current carrying value, the basis for any change in value and cumulative cash received.
- The current recovery estimate and expected time to resolution, measured against the milestones underwritten at entry, with any variance explained.
- A frank account of positions running behind plan, given while their outcome is still uncertain.
At portfolio level it shows aggregate invested capital, cumulative recoveries to date, unrealised estimated recovery value kept clearly apart from cash received, distributions reconciled to recoveries, and capital available for further deployment. Independent valuation should follow the cadence set in the fund documents, with the valuer named, and an advisory committee of senior investor representatives can review major asset management decisions.
Several patterns call for further questions. Where every position is carried at cost until it resolves, valuation is being deferred. Marks that only ever move upwards suggest an asymmetric process. Aggregate net asset value with no position-level detail leaves an investor unable to judge anything, and a reported return made up mostly of unrealised value is in substance an opinion. Reporting also rests on monitoring: covenants tested monthly and quarterly, operating performance reviewed on the same cycle, resolution milestones tracked continuously and regular contact with the management of any business under the manager’s control.
Questions for assessing a manager
The questions below bring together, in one list, the points an investor assessing a distressed credit manager should test. Each can be answered from records, and a manager with a working process should be able to produce them.
- Which definition of market size does the manager use, and does it describe the stock of stressed assets or the volume likely to change hands?
- What share of last year’s completed transactions came bilaterally and what share through competitive processes, how many opportunities were reviewed, and what was the conversion rate at each stage?
- What does the manager consider its capacity to be, and how does the size of the vehicle compare with what the pipeline can absorb at disciplined prices?
- How many transactions did the manager walk away from on price last year, and what did those assets later trade at?
- For a sample of positions, who valued the collateral and how recently, what share of the cover is land and buildings with verified title, and is each charge confirmed as first-ranking?
- What have comparable assets actually fetched in enforcement sales, compared with their valuation reports?
- What timeline does the manager underwrite for each recovery route, and how have observed timelines compared with it?
- In which states does the collateral sit, and what enforcement capability does the manager have in each of them?
- Can the manager show the positions that did not work, and what was recovered where the underwriting proved wrong?
- Are problem positions recognised early, are losses taken and the capital redeployed, and are interim valuations marked down as readily as up?
- Can the manager provide a sample quarterly report at position level, with realised cash separated from unrealised marks?
The answers on failed positions carry particular weight. A strategy that protects capital as described loses little on its mistakes, and the record of those mistakes is the most direct evidence available. A manager willing to discuss only successful exits leaves an investor with no way to test the claim.
Prepared for educational purposes only. Not an offer to sell securities, investment advice or a recommendation. Views are as at the date of publication and are subject to change.